

GREEN LIVELIHOODS ALLIANCE- JUST ENERGY TRANSITION PROGRAMME

PREPARED BY: GLA JUST ENERGY TRANSITION TEAM

PROMOTING AN INCLUSIVE AND JUST TRANSITION PROCESS TOWARDS RENEWABLE ENERGY
ACCESS IN THE GLA FOCUS COUNTRIES OF NIGERIA, DR CONGO AND UGANDA



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This inception report presents the outline of the thematic programme on inclusive and just energy transition under the Green Livelihoods Alliance programme (2017-2020). It will be implemented by local CSOs and alliance partners (IUCN, Tropenbos International, Milieudefensie) in the Nigerian Delta, the greater Virunga landscape and the Ituri landscape (both bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda). The programme focuses on lobby, advocacy and campaigning work coupled with capacity building of CSOs. The three landscapes differ with regards to the degree to which oil exploration or exploration currently takes place in the three landscapes differs, as well as the levels of damage caused by operations, the nature of legislative frameworks, and the experience and capacities of CSOs on the matter. There are however also strong similarities in contextual elements that underpin the need for the thematic programme on inclusive and just energy transition towards the development and use of renewable green energy options. In the remainder of the report we mostly refer to 'just energy transition programme' or simply 'thematic programme'.

THE ISSUES AT STAKE

Especially in landscapes rich in valuable natural resources, such as oil, forested and associated water-based ecosystems (lakes, mangroves) are **at risk of degradation and pollution** by exploration and exploitation of oil, through deforestation for installations/pipelines, oil spills, and gas flaring. Of particular concern is potential damage to national reserves/parks, and spawning grounds of fish in the Delta and along the shores of Lake Albert and Lake Edward. Also, **governance of oil resources is characterized by high degrees of inequality**. Especially communities/ordinary citizens lack voice in decision-making about oil exploration and exploitation plans and benefit sharing. On the other end of the spectrum, geo-political interests also influence oil resource governance in the focus countries. Furthermore, violations of **local, national and international best practices on human and environmental rights** are widespread and corporate accountability is generally weak. In some cases regulations are absent, conflicting or lack harmonization, but mostly a lack of will (influenced by corruption), weak enforcement capacities on behalf of relevant state agencies, and a lack of accountability mechanisms in the home countries of multinationals are noted. Of specific concern are the transboundary challenges related to the management of DR Congo-Uganda oil reserves because it increases the risk of conflict in the region.

In spite of (prospected) oil production and export, millions of people in the focus countries have no access to energy and mostly rely on fuel wood and charcoal for cooking. This constitutes a massive threat to deforestation and underlines the urgency for a transition towards renewable sources of energy, in particular on community level. But as governments in the focus countries predominantly appreciate the economic benefits of oil exploitation, a discussion around long-term costs and benefits of oil is weakly embedded in **broader reflection and agenda setting** on renewable energy sources, inclusive and just energy transition, and other values (ex. cultural values, livelihoods, biodiversity, water, tourism) the oil-rich landscapes offer. This links on global level with reflections on unsustainable nature of fossil fuels in meeting worldwide demand for energy within the limited carbon budget defined by the worldwide ambition to keep **climate change** under two degrees global warming.

HOW THE JUST ENERGY TRANSITION PROGRAMME AIMS TO CONTRIBUTE

The thematic programme, in the long-term (sphere of interest), wants to contribute to a pro-people, inclusive and just energy transition process (moving away from oil/fossil fuels towards renewable energy) that specifically considers gender and vulnerable groups. Four pathways of intermediary change within the sphere of influence of the programme contribute to the overall goal.

R1: CSOs are unified around a common ideology on inclusive and just energy transition:

Most effective lobby and advocacy for inclusive and just energy transition can be achieved if CSOs speak with one voice, communicate the same messages, use the same methods of action, and have shared and complementary capacities. That is why capacity building, exchange for mutual learning and coalition building is crucial. Broadening the knowledge and experience of the coalition on energy transition and strengthening capacities on research, lobby and advocacy requires particular attention. Also exchange with CSOs from other African countries and, where relevant, northern countries will be stimulated.

R2: Relevant national government agencies in the African focus countries progressively encourage/promote an inclusive and just energy transition: In order for effective energy transition to gain ground, government agencies dealing with oil and renewable energy in the selected focus countries need to be informed, convinced and engaged towards promoting it. Lobby and advocacy that is based on well-researched analyses on the economic potential of renewable options for development, coupled with legislative lobby on specific (inter) national policy development will increase government engagement and eventually budgeting for just energy transition.

R3: Best practices of inclusive and just energy transition exist in communities in the selected landscapes: The programme aims to raise awareness on community level and stimulate engagement/participation in energy transition agenda setting processes. Influenced by the previous pathway (including availability of community projects around renewable energy), we expect that the demand for and use for renewable energy options increases on community level.

R4: New or existing oil exploration/extraction projects are halted or delayed: The programme will also look at oil exploration and exploitation that is already taking place (Nigeria) or at provisions made by government and private actors to launch operations in time to come (DR Congo, Uganda). Violations by companies and governments of international best practice around human and environment rights standards will be addressed by the programme through campaigning and litigation. This will further motivate support for the need for energy transition and reduce demand for oil. Litigation and campaign work may also delay (and potentially halt) oil projects.

LOBBY AND ADVOCACY STRATEGIES

The main (inter) national lobby and advocacy strategies used are campaigning methods (for exposure), policy briefs/workshops/meetings, litigation, exchange visits between communities/parliamentarians/CSOs, media work and building a strong community movement. The programme partners will work on the development, improvement, and harmonization or enforcement monitoring of selected policies and regulations. Amongst others, international frameworks relevant to the thematic programme are the Paris Agreements, the REDD+ framework, Environmental Impact Assessment Frameworks, the UN treaty on Business and Human Rights, the MDGs/SDGs, and the ICC environmental crimes mandate. On national level policies on renewable energy, petroleum bills/regulations, the locus standi principle for legal community representation, environmental bills/acts, community compensation, and licensing to oil companies will be addressed. Trans-boundary Agreements on oil revenue sharing and the ICGLR natural resource initiative are of particular cross-border relevance for eastern DR Congo and Uganda.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Capacity building of CSOs under the thematic programme specifically addresses methods, knowledge and skills that support the pathways of change, notably on coalition building, community movement building, solid research and publication methodologies, cost-benefit analyses of long-term financial prospects of energy transition, lobby and advocacy strategies, and security monitoring and safeguarding of CSO partners. On programme management level the programme will strengthen capacities to use outcome harvesting as PMEL method, data validation and documentation, communication strategies of lessons learned, and French-English language skills as the partner network is bilingual. A preliminary identification of other CSOs has been done that may be able to offer something around these 'needs' from an exchange and learning perspective.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A steering group is put in place that includes one elected partner per focus country and alliance member representatives. The steering group assures overall coordination of programme implementation and interventions and meets twice a year (of which one meeting coincides with an annual monitoring meeting). The effectiveness of the steering group and its members will be evaluated by the end of 2017. Programme implementation is supported by a liaison role in charge of facilitating effective programme implementation, coordination, monitoring and reporting and learning the African implementing partners. The Nigeria partner ERA has been unanimously chosen for this role. Within the coalition ERA will be responsible for organisation of meetings, information sharing, writing annual work plans for this thematic programme and annual reporting (both based on individual partner plans/reports), identifying main lessons learned, and assuring synergy with other thematic programmes of the GLA.

In conclusion, the thematic programme aims to engage communities, CSOs, government agencies and address violations by private actors in support of a process of reflecting on, accepting and putting to practice an inclusive and just energy transition. This directly reflects the overall goal of the GLA programme to strengthen inclusive and sustainable governance of forested landscapes, in particular addressing involvement in decision-making of communities and vulnerable groups around the use and protection of forested landscapes. Inclusive governance arguably better maintains the international public goods of the landscape, such as food, water, biodiversity, climate, livelihoods, development. ■

1. INTRODUCTION

The Green Livelihoods Alliance programme is implemented by IUCN Netherlands (IUCN), Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie, VMD) and Tropenbos International (TBI), with support from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs under its 'dialogue and dissident' programme. The GLA programme focuses on lobby and advocacy by civil society organisations (CSOs) that share goals to represent and empower local communities in lobby & advocacy to bring about inclusive and sustainable governance of forested landscapes in 9 countries, of which 5 in Africa. Forested landscapes are the spatial level of governance where competing claims and trade-offs between different land uses and actors can be addressed integrally, bearing in mind services such landscapes offer (food security, water, biodiversity, livelihoods and climate control). Exchange of experience, capacity building and (joint) learning is key to the GLA programme. Addressing important drivers that generally contribute to deforestation operationalizes the programme: agro commodities, and extractives.

This inception report operationalizes the extractives theme, whereby focus is placed on oil and more specifically on inclusive and just energy transition. The programme will focus on Africa only, and will be implemented in the Nigerian Delta, the greater Virunga landscape and Ituri landscape (both bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda). These landscapes have been chosen with regard to the relevance and urgency to address energy transition, the potential of building on previous engagement of the consortium members and their partners, the potential of complementing other (large) initiatives, as well as the possibility for exchange on lessons learned between the landscapes. To inform and inspire participating CSOs, learning is also stimulated with other African countries where oil exploitation takes place, like Cameroun, Tanzania, Kenya, etc.

RELEVANCE OF OIL AS DRIVER OF DEFORESTATION

African forests disappear and degrade with alarming pace because of human activities competing for resources to meet the huge demand for agricultural produce, mineral ores and fossil fuels. In landscapes rich in oil the ecosystem is especially at risk of pollution caused by oil spills. Poor will and capacity to govern oil exploration and extraction in a transparent and inclusive manner exacerbate these risks. In the countries selected for the thematic programme ordinary citizens hardly participate in decision-making around oil exploration and exploitation affecting their communities. Also, the presence of, compliance with and enforcement capacities associated with regulations and policies relevant to international best practice on human and environmental rights associated with oil exploration and extraction often fall short. High levels of corruption cause intertwined interests and in part obstruct enforcement. Corruption also obscures how oil revenues are distributed, with communities hardly benefiting.

There is very limited attention for a broader reflection on how the exploration and exploitation of oil from these landscapes relates to (environmental) costs, benefits that can be derived from environmental and cultural values, as well as to long-term energy needs and general development of the country. It is in particular important to address the energy poverty of the millions of people that have no access to energy and mostly rely on fuel wood and charcoal for cooking, as well as incorporating reflection on climate change. On a more global level it also links with the unsustainable nature of fossil fuels in meeting worldwide demand for energy within the limited carbon budget defined by the worldwide ambition to keep climate change under two degrees global warming. As a consequence, investment flows (that may in part originate from the oil sector) are currently only marginally oriented towards solutions that aim to deal with (energy) poverty of the local population in the oil-rich landscapes through offering an inclusive and just transition towards renewable energy solutions. In the selected landscapes, the thematic programme on just energy transition aims to **initiate support for an awareness raising and agenda-setting process** among state actors, companies, donor institutions, financing institutions, CSOs and communities **on the need for an inclusive and just transition** towards renewable energy sources away from fossil fuels.

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

An independent consultant prepared this inception report. CSO partners, alliance partners and other CSOs relevant to oil as a driver of deforestation in the selected landscapes actively participated in the process through (Skype/telephone) interviews, digital surveys and a strategic planning workshop in Abuja held early November 2016. Additional data were collected through relevant scientific papers, NGO research papers, news and lobby reports and company information.


To collate and complement, also relevant overall GLA documentation was studied, as well as documentation from the other two thematic programmes and country-relevant programmes. The core team from the Dutch alliance members met several times to discuss progress and content. This team consisted of Donald Pols, Wolfgang Richert, Inge Vianen and during the workshop Ike Teuling, all from Milieudefensie; Joost van Montfort and Tina Lain from IUCN, and Trudi van Ingen from Tropenbos. All Dutch and African partners provided feedback on a draft version of the inception report. ■

2. PROBLĚM AND CONTEXT ANALYSIS

2.1 SKETCH OF THE DRIVER

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CONSUMPTION

Although projections differ, it is expected that over the next 15-20 years global demand for energy will steeply rise. Most of the global growth in energy demand comes from emerging economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Africa currently accounts for 10% of global oil exports and 42% of its energy consumption comes from oil, 28% from gas, 22% from coal, 1% from nuclear sources, 6% from hydro, and only 1% from renewable sources¹. Overall global production rates for oil will slow or decline, which is mostly due to decline in active oil fields. Nevertheless, the International Energy Agency (IEA) anticipates - regardless of the recent drop in prices² - that the prices per barrel may rise to \$200 in 2035 (\$40 per barrel in 2016). OPEC estimates that long-term prices are to reach \$92/b by 2040 in real prices (2015 value of the dollar), which is the equivalent of \$155/b in nominal prices. If the increase in world energy demand were to be covered solely by oil, as the image below shows, production would have to rise by over 25% between 2015 and 2030. The incentive for governments to continue exploration and production of oil hence remains, while such an increase in fossil fuel use would be disastrous for the global climate and ecology. It is hence justified and opportune that the just energy transition programme initiates agenda setting on inclusive and just transition (including energy alternatives) in the African context, as well as to mitigate and eventually halt harmful effects of oil on the forested landscapes in the focus countries of the programme.



Source: International Energy Agency

OIL AND DEFORESTATION

Oil exploration and exploitation is generally not a main direct cause of deforestation, as it does not require that large areas of forests be cleared. Albeit more indirect, it does create significant and diverse risks for the future survival of forested landscapes. Oil pipelines usually pass through areas of ecological importance and potential oil spills pollute the soil and water sources, affecting drinking water as well as spawning grounds and habitats for a variety of species of animals, trees and plants. This in turn affects the livelihoods of people depending on the services offered by the forested landscape. Infrastructure for oil exploration also creates new access to formerly inaccessible areas, leading to further deforestation for agriculture or fuel wood. In certain situations, people living in or directly around oil concessions are relocated to other areas, increasing the ecological pressure on the host-areas when not accompanied by sustainable livelihood development. Furthermore, the oil produced in the selected African landscapes is mainly destined for export. Neither oil nor energy originating from renewable non-fossil alternatives is currently able to meet domestic energy demand; hence people continue to rely en masse on fuel wood and charcoal. In the case of the countries selected for the thematic programme, the biggest share of the regional (and in Nigeria national) supply of fuel wood and charcoal comes from the forest areas in the oil-rich Delta, the Virunga landscape, and the central DR Congo landscape (the latter is included in another GLA thematic programme).

¹ BP Statistical Review Africa Energy Market 2015

² OPEC, 'Word oil outlook 2016', chapter 1: oil supply and demand outlook to 2040, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications

OIL AND THE NIGER DELTA

The forest-mangrove ecosystem of the Delta in Nigeria is in the top 10 of the globally most important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems.³ It covers 12% of the country's surface and is home to 30 million people. The Delta is very rich in oil and reserves are estimated at 28.2 billion barrels.⁴ Since 2012 the Federal Government has set a production target of 2.48 million barrels a day (mbpd), of which 1.5 mbpd come from the onshore and shallow water Delta region, and 0.9 mbpd from the deep-water concessions. It makes Nigeria the 13th largest oil producing country for 2014.⁵ Indigenous companies produce 11% of the target (276,000 bpd). Among the multinational companies active in Nigeria, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (Exxon Mobil), Chevron Nigeria and Total Elf are the largest producers. Domestic consumption of oil stands at 450,000 bpd (around 18% of daily production) and the rest is exported.

The consequences of oil exploitation in the Delta are significant. It is estimated that between 9 and 13 million barrels of oil have been spilled in Nigeria since 1958 in over 7,000 spilling incidents,⁶ affecting the livelihoods of communities who largely depend on the resources offered by the ecosystem (agriculture, fishing, etc.). In 2011, after an extensive investigation of pollution levels in Ogoniland in Rivers state near Port Harcourt, UNEP published a report with a set of recommendations on the clean up of Ogoniland. Although the Nigerian Government early June 2016 announced to commence a five-year clean up programme worth 1 billion \$US to restore 2,600km² in Ogoniland, full ecosystem restoration of the swamps, creeks, fishing grounds and mangroves may take up to 25 years.⁷ In addition, the burning of natural gas ('flaring') as a by-product of oil production releases CO₂ and toxic residues into the air (mostly sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides) and causes acidification of rain and waterways. It has also been associated with health impacts, such as lung diseases, cancer and reproductive problems. Even though under Nigerian law gas flaring is not allowed, around 63% of oil-associated gas is flared on an annual basis, or 17.4 billion m³ of gas. This is almost half of the 40 billion m³ annual consumption of gas in the Netherlands. The economic value of the gas flared in Nigeria represents an annual loss of \$2.5 billion.⁸

In addition to oil damage affecting the Delta, the demand for land and (cooking) energy by Nigeria's ever-growing population and small-scale industry is a main driver of deforestation, which happens at a rate of 1.9% per year (1963-1991) in the Delta.⁹ Around 10% of Nigeria's surface was still forested in 2010¹⁰, down to 7.7% in 2015.¹¹ Eighty-five per cent of Nigeria's consumed energy, or 99.3 Mtoe annually, comes from biofuels and waste. Especially wood is popular for cooking due to a lack of other energy sources and each person consumes on average 3.3m³ of wood per year (around 1,000 kgs). Although Nigeria's Renewable Energy Master Plan (REMP), states that by 2025 10% of all energy consumed must come from renewable sources, concrete agendas for practice are still lacking.

OIL AND THE GREATER VIRUNGA LANDSCAPE

The greater Virunga landscape along the Albertine Rift in the boundary region of the DR Congo, Uganda and Rwanda covers 15,155 km² and includes 13 national parks and reserves (including the Virunga National Park classified as Unesco World Heritage site) and accommodates 43% of Africa's bird species, 27% of its mammals, and more than 10% of its reptiles, amphibians, and plants.¹² Among these are several rare and endangered species that exist nowhere else. The ecosystem has important functions for climatological stability, carbon-dioxide absorption, and (rain) water distribution. Several millions of people - albeit still on subsistence level - depend on the landscape for their livelihoods as it caters for food security, fresh water and income from agriculture, fisheries and tourism.

The forest coverage of Virunga was in 2006 estimated at 3,143km³.¹³ Deforestation of the Virunga landscape is around 1% year, which is high considering that any form of felling trees is prohibited within the park's perimeters. The trade in charcoal for household energy consumption causes most of this, because alternative energy sources are not available to the people. Between 2001 and 2014 around the size of 11,000 football fields were turned into charcoal, at an estimated trade value of up to \$35 million per year.¹⁴ The trade is largely in the hands of a criminal network involving rebel factions (especially the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwandan) who de-facto control a section of the park and are aided by collaborators from Congolese security forces, politicians and the labourers from the general public in return for profit sharing. It is sympto-

³ Onojeghuo and Onojeghuo (2015) 'Protected area monitoring in the Niger Delta using multi-temporal remote sensing', *Environments* 2015(2): 500-520, p.500.

⁴ NNPC <http://www.nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures/oilproduction.aspx>. ERA says these figures must be interpreted with care, as they are produced by the companies themselves to raise investment profile.

⁵ 'Total Petroleum and Other Liquids Production, 2014'. U.S. Energy Information Administration.

⁶ The News, Nigerian website, 29 May 2016, <http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2016/05/who-owns-nigerias-oil-wells-memo-to-niger-delta-avengers/>

⁷ ERA (2013) 'Confronting the menace of oil spills: How stakeholders should respond', Newsletter issue 21.

⁸ The Guardian, 2 June 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/02/niger-delta-oil-spill-clean-up-launched-ogoniland-communities-1bn>

⁹ Ojugwo, A (2013) 'Negative effects of gas flaring: The Nigerian Experience', *Journal of Environmental Pollution and Public Health*, Vol. 1 (1): 6-8.

¹⁰ Salami (1999) op.cit in Enaruvbe and Atofo (2014) 'Analysis of deforestation pattern in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria', *Journal of Land Use Science*, October 2014.

¹¹ FAO (2010) *Global Forest Resources Assessment, Nigeria Country Report*, Forestry Department.

¹² FAO (2015) *Global Forest Resources Assessment*.

¹³ Wildlife Conservation Society, 'Greater Virunga Landscape', http://fscdn.wcs.org/2015/07/24/y08bn4z7e_GVL_prospectus.pdf

¹⁴ Denvers, D. et al (2006) *Les forêts du Bassin du Congo: Etat des forêts*. EU publication, Luxembourg.

¹⁵ Holly (2016) *The Mafia in the Park: A charcoal syndicate is threatening Virunga, Africa's oldest national park*, p1. Enough project

matic for more general security concerns, as the region is known for its history of (transboundary) armed conflict. There are currently between 10-15 small and medium-sized armed groups active in (the vicinity) of the park.

The main underlying cause of conflict in the region is the control over natural resources, and cross-border oil reserves pose a significant conflict-threat between communities and countries if not well managed. On the Uganda side of the Graben, 6.5 billion barrels have been discovered, of which currently 1.7-2 billion barrels are exploitable. With exploitation costs of less than \$1 per barrel (instead of the general \$5-\$25 per barrel) it presents a profitable investment opportunity for companies. Oil production is expected to reach 200,000 and 250,000 bpd based on current discoveries. This makes Uganda a mid-level African producer of oil, comparable with present day production levels in Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Currently 40% of the identified areas in Uganda have been explored and companies are in the process of applying for licenses. There are also plans underway to build a refinery and a 2,000 km long pipeline to the east African coast. On the DR Congo side preliminary exploration work took place but findings are not (yet) publicly shared, so it is difficult to estimate reserves.

In Uganda, part of the oil blocks cover Lake Albert and Queen Elizabeth National Park, bordering Virunga National Park in DR Congo. The Ngaji oil block extends into Lake Edward (which is part of Virunga National Park). Also on the Congolese side, 85% of the oil blocks fall within the perimeters of the Park. Given its status as World Heritage site this is illegal. Although (inter) national pressure by environmental activists has prevented activities to go beyond preliminary explorative work, the concessions within the park are still not cancelled. Because of their transboundary nature, exploitation of oil in one country inevitably impacts the cross-border ecosystem. Especially for Lake Albert and Edward it risks damaging spawning grounds, potentially affecting the fishery livelihoods of thousands of families. Also, because Uganda is making steps forward in exploitation it might speed up a similar process in DR Congo. The Presidents of Uganda, DR Congo, Tanzania and Kenya already made agreements around the property of shared infrastructure (ex. pipelines) and potential benefit sharing. There is hence an urgent need for CSOs to address inclusive and just energy transition towards sustainable alternatives, while also influencing the legal processes around oil currently underway. In current government analyses, the economic value of the greater Virunga landscape is not included in the cost-benefit analyses around oil made (ex. tourism, climatological services, hydropower). If regional security and stability were to be improved, the services of the landscape could increase to a value of \$1.1 billion/year.¹⁹

OIL IN THE ITURI LANDSCAPE

Ituri Province in the northeast of DR Congo, borders Uganda and South Sudan and consists of five territories (Aru, Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi and Mambasa). The western part is covered by primary forest home to a number of rare species, including the Okapi, the forest elephant, 13 monkey species, the leopard and different antelopes and buffalos. Also minority groups like the Mbuti and Efe Pygmies live here. The forests are at danger because of logging of high-value timber trees such as African mahoganies and *Milicia excelsa*, whose wood is considered to be of higher quality than wood from the forests in central and western Ituri.²⁰ The exploitation of wood is not regulated, hardly contributes economically to the forest communities, and is not accompanied by reforestation.²¹ In addition, concessions are sold and granted without considering the rights of the autochthon Pygmy communities. As a consequence, conflicts over (forested) land are common in Ituri.

More towards the east, near Lake Albert, the landscape is mainly composed of semi-deciduous forests, representing the transition area between the closed canopy of the rainforest and the eastern Savannah landscape. This is where two more oil blocks of the Albertine Rift Valley are situated: Mahagi-Port (bloc I) and Kasenyi (bloc II), owned by Total and Tullow Oil of Congo. Other than initial seismic scoping (findings about estimated reserves have not been publicly shared yet), no preparations for exploitation are currently underway. This may however change later this year, especially since Uganda is moving forward with exploitation on their side of the same oil blocks. Overall capacity on oil as well as on just energy transition in the Ituri area is low on the side of communities, civil society and state institutions. This is in part also caused by inter-ethnic violent conflicts (some over land) currently taking place in the Province, which focus attention mainly on security concerns. Raising awareness and capacities on the subject matter and building an effective coalition of CSOs for lobby and advocacy work in favour of leaving the oil in soil and instead

¹⁶Stearns, J. and C. Vogel (2015) The landscape of armed groups in Eastern Congo, Congo Research Group.

¹⁷<http://www.energypost.eu/virunga-the-real-price-of-energy/>

¹⁸Patey, L. (2015) Uganda's Oil: Hard bargaining and complex politics in East Africa, OIES paper WPM 60, Oxford: Oxford Institute of Energy Studies

¹⁹WWF (2013) 'The Economic Value of Virunga National Park', the Dalberg report.

²⁰Makana, JR and Thomas, S (2006) 'Impacts of selective logging and agricultural clearing on forest structure, floristic composition and diversity, and timber tree regeneration in the Ituri Forest, Democratic Republic of Congo', Biodiversity and Conservation vol 15., p. 1375-1397.

²¹Drazo Nicaise, A (2016) Rapport de Mission de Tropenbos International en Ituri.

focusing on agenda-setting around renewable alternatives is an important concern.

SHARED CHALLENGES AND DIFFERENCES

The chosen forested landscapes have shared challenges around oil and energy governance that defines the context of work and the need for action under the just energy transition programme.

- First, the discussion around long-term costs and benefits of the exploration and exploitation of oil is weakly embedded in broader reflection and agenda setting on renewable energy sources, climate change and inclusive and just energy transition.
- Landscapes rich in oil, and especially forested and associated water-based ecosystems (lakes, mangroves) are at risk of degradation and pollution by exploration and exploitation of oil, through deforestation for installations/pipelines, oil spills, and gas flaring. Of particular concern is potential damage to unique national reserves/parks, and spawning grounds of fish in the Delta, Lake Albert and Lake Edward.
- The governance of oil resources is characterized by high degrees of inequality, whereby especially communities/ordinary citizens lack voice when it comes to decision-making about oil exploration and exploitation plans and benefit sharing. Also geo-political interests influence unequal oil resource governance in the focus countries.
- Violations of local, national and international best practices on human and environmental rights by companies and governments are widespread and corporate accountability is generally weak. In some cases regulations are absent, conflicting or lack harmonization. But mostly a lack of will (influenced by corruption) and lack of mechanisms for keeping multinationals accountable in their home countries, and low enforcement capacities are noted.

Differences with regards to the status of oil between the countries/landscapes involved in the thematic programme need to be noted as these differences will mainly define what the exact focus of certain activities will be.

In Nigeria, exploitation is on going since the 1960s. The high oil dependence of the country presents a situation where, on the one hand, those (illegally) benefiting from oil revenues might be reluctant to change, whilst on the other hand global market developments (recent drops in oil prices) may open up space for discussions around transition. On community level people generally resist to oil because of the damage it has done, providing potential for this thematic programme to mobilise these communities around renewable energy alternatives.


In DR Congo only preliminary exploration took place in the eastern landscape. Given its proximity and overlap with crucial world heritage sites, government actors are divided over the question whether exploitation should take place. Communities are generally lacking full comprehension of risks associated with the exploration of oil as well as possible alternatives. This is in particular the case in the Ituri landscape, where the lack of awareness extends to civil society organisations in general. There is hence ground to advocate for leaving the oil in soil, especially since DR Congo's economy is not depending on oil. Also, neither the exploitation of offshore oil in Congo's Central Province (at the West coast) nor the exploitation of other resources such as minerals (ex. gold) and timber has benefited local populations.

In Uganda primary exploitation is underway and there are plans for further demarcation of oil blocks (some covering crucial forest reserves), the construction of a refinery and the development of a pipeline all the way to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The government is strongly in favour of exploitation, seeing it as 'the way' to develop the country. Civil society is more reserved, but because the general population has mostly positive expectations and hopes that oil will bring them development, pro and contra arguments co-exist in the Ugandan context: certain actors want to divert towards renewable energy, others are strongly in support of working with companies in strengthening best practices of existing oil operations. This thematic programme does not reflect the latter perspective.

2.2

ACTOR ANALYSIS

This paragraph presents an analysis of actors that are of relevance to the thematic programme on just energy transition, from the perspective of their potential interest in the expected programme results (horizontal axe in the graph below), and the potential for collaboration with the coalition in achieving the goals (vertical axe). Some narrative is provided on their current role/collaboration with regards to just energy transition and/or oil. In the graph, blue represents local/provincial actors, yellow national actors and purple international actors.



Local/provincial/district level actors

- **Women associations:** Women associations have the capacity to play a positive role in a just energy transition process on the ground, as well as in pressuring the government.
- **Local chiefs/leaders/opinion leaders:** Local leaders generally have the capacity to mobilize community support because people generally trust them. Depending on customary powers attributed to them, they have in some contexts a strong role in decision-making. There are however also plenty of cases whereby local leaders collaborate with oil companies against the interests of their communities.
- **Religious institutions:** Religious institutions have the capacity to reach out to communities emphasizing their rights, and can also be used as a 'neutral' advocate.
- **Local government administration:** Local administration has close contact with and often benefits from corporate interests. Their attitude towards CSOs is generally one of suspicion, hence collaboration is often problematic.
- **Provincial deputies:** As elected members of local/provincial government, deputies have the capacity to represent the 'voice' of communities with regards to their claims/needs. It however very much depends on personality whether they represent communities or defend their own (financial) interests and collaborate with corporations.
- **Renewable energy businesses:** Economic operators are important because they make renewable technologies available on the local level, offering communities opportunities to expand their livelihoods. Business relations exist with local communities (demand), and with government agencies in negotiating market expansion/access.

- **Universities:** Universities have the capacity to contribute to the public debate about negative impacts of oil extractions and to raise awareness among the young generation about the need for just energy transition. By the wider society they are generally respected for their knowledge and validity of arguments.
- **Security forces:** Security forces have in theory the capacity to protect environmental activists. They however mostly protect the interests of corporations/government or actively participate in illegal exploitation of oil (criminal networks, rebel factions).
- **Artisanal refiners and militants:** In the context of Nigeria organized gangs sabotage pipelines for personal enrichment. These groups collaborate with local leaders as entry point, they also collaborate closely with artisanal refiners, and they are in conflict with (multi) national oil companies.
- **Armed/rebel groups:** In the context of DR Congo different rebel/armed factions create insecurity in the oil-rich landscapes. Armed actors will potentially 'ally' with oil companies/government or start sabotage like in Nigeria for personal enrichment if exploitation would start.

National level actors

- **Presidency:** The Presidency is mostly driven by an interest in oil money and potentially difficult to get on board. There is a lack of knowledge about the economic opportunities of a just energy transition. Close relationships exist with oil companies, home governments of these companies and international finance institutions, whilst those with CSOs are often strained.
- **National oil companies:** National oil companies defend the 'oil agenda' and responsible for pollution and human rights violations. Depending on the level of operations they have conflicting or not yet existing relations with communities, they have very close (corrupted) ties with political actors who protect their economic interests, and they generally have a tense relationship with CSOs.
- **Legislative state authorities (on oil, energy):** Although by mandate capable of playing a corrective role through legal repression in case of violations, legislative actors are mostly protecting the vested interests in oil of political elites. Collaboration on legislative development/review with CSOs exists, but there are also conflicts with CSOs around non-enforcement of existing legislation.
- **Regulative/enforcement state authorities (on oil, energy):** With a mandate to assure the provision of energy access, oversight functions of regulative authorities are weak and knowledge about a just transition towards renewable energy is missing. Their close ties with political leadership often strains collaboration with CSOs.
- **Governmental environmental protection agencies:** Their mandate to protect the environment, organize training and investigate oil spills/violations is in some circumstances eroded by political interests, and 'voice' to halt oil exploration/exploitation in conservation areas is not always very strong. Communities are generally disappointed about a lack of representation of community interests by these institutions. In part this is caused because these institutions generally lack the resources to play a meaningful role in environmental protection.
- **National parliament:** Given their important role in law making, national parliament is indispensable for collaboration. Potential for success is very much influenced by personal characteristics of parliament members however.
- **Syndicates/trade unions:** Unions have the capacity to mobilize community members and play a role of intermediary between them and companies. In the case of Nigeria where oil jobs will be lost as part of an energy transition process, unions play a role in developing the pathways for a just transition together with civil society.

International level actors

- **Multinational oil corporations:** Companies have an interest in maximize profit through controlling access to fossil fuel reserves, distribution and export. Climate change and community interests are often marginally taken into account. Collaboration with CSOs is marginal due to problems of access and conflict. Companies do have very close relations with state agencies and the presidency. In areas where pollution/violations take place relations with communities are based on conflict and mistrust (sabotage of pipelines).
- **Shareholders:** Shareholder value of fossil fuel companies can only be sustained if oil companies continue exploration and exploitation of new resources and maximise profits. If they can be convinced that investing in alternatives pays off, shareholders can be influential in shifting course.

- Embassies/home governments: Whilst defending the interests of their home countries, some Embassies can be considered as an ally in this programme, whilst others appear to have hidden agendas in favour of multinational oil companies. Home governments can play a role in forcing multinational oil companies to apply better standards.
- Bilateral donors: Bilateral donors provide funding or technical support through their respective development agencies and can be an important potential ally in influencing financing institutions and home governments (ex. GIZ, USAID).
- INGOs: Depending on their thematic orientation, INGOs can be used as an ally in pushing the agenda for energy transitions also because they generally have relatively good access to state authorities for diplomacy.
- World Bank/international finance institutions: Because large international banks provide investment capital to companies and technical support to governments, they are interesting to target for diversion/allocation of funds towards energy transition.
- EU: The EU is an important political actor around harmonization and enforcement of regulations around accountability of multinationals in different member states.
- International media: International media can play an important role in reporting on the need for a just energy transition, as well as to disclose violations by oil companies. Collaboration between international media and CSOs is generally good.

2.3 POLICY ANALYSIS

The focus of the policy-related lobby and advocacy under the thematic programme focuses on the development, improvement or harmonization of legislation, policies and/or regulations and on strengthening enforcement of existing policies. Lobby and advocacy work will build on international frameworks as common reference. Nevertheless, and depending on each country context, also certain national policy frameworks can be addressed. Mostly this will be done in conjunction with planned efforts in the GLA country programmes and/or other oil-related programmes that the participating CSOs implement. The policies highlighted below present currently identified policies. With time additional policy work might be developed, depending on evolutions in (inter) national political processes.

Paris agreement: Countries across the globe adopted a historic climate agreement at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015. The agreement, in short, sets out to limit the increase in global average temperature rise to ‘well below 2 degrees and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, and to achieve net zero emissions in the second half of this century’, meaning that nearly all fossil fuel use worldwide should be banned by 2050. From a carbon budget perspective this means that 84% of all currently known and listed reserves of fossil fuel cannot be burned and should stay in the ground, which should have implications on national decision making to start new oil exploration projects.²² The timeframe under consideration within the Paris Agreement will leave most countries in Africa inhospitable by the time the goal of zero emissions would be reached. The Paris Agreement also offers a funding modality for related initiatives in the countries. In the longer run, there is a need for a global policy that addresses how to curb the demand for fossil fuels, for example through carbon tax, diversion of investments, tariffs and other measures. Foundations for such a policy will be laid by the work proposed under the just energy transition programme.

REDD+ Framework: In 2005 the REDD (+) Framework was adopted under the UNFCCC with the objective of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. It also addresses the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. Throughout the years additional focus was defined, for example the provision of methodological guidance on how to move to real practice of community benefits of (non) carbon resources (2009), policy approaches and positive incentives for emission reductions from forest degradation and deforestation (2010), and the provision of guidance on systems providing information on safeguards and forest reference levels (2011). In 2013 in Warsaw, 7 additional decisions were made amongst others around result-based fi-

²² Leave it in the ground initiative, 2016 <http://leave-it-in-the-ground.org>

nancing, coordination of implementation support, modalities for forest monitoring and technical assessment of emission levels. So far REDD+ seems to have been most successful in addressing land grabbing/seizure. To communities it is mostly known because it limits their access to forest resources.

Environmental Impact Assessment Frameworks: Although the target countries all have legal provisions obliging oil companies to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), the process is flawed. In particular mitigation of (potential) risks is unsatisfactory, inevitably leading to human rights abuses and pollution. The process is also biased, whereby companies pay for the studies to be done and in particular omit to include communities and civil society in the process (public hearings, consultation). Also a process whereby the general public can react to findings is either lacking or difficult in terms of 'access' to findings. For example, translations are not available or remain too technical for people to understand. Also, when communities do oppose findings or decisions following EIAs, their stance is not binding and projects may still go ahead. Furthermore, EIA frameworks do not consider wider concerns around human, social, cultural or gender rights. EIAs are neither placed into a more strategic analysis around oil exploitation as per the context.

(Forthcoming) UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights: It is increasingly argued that the UN Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000) and OECD guidelines on Due Diligence that guide companies fall short. Over the past years a process to adopt a UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights was started and a draft treaty is expected in 2017. As also flagged by the GLA agro-commodity inception report, this treaty could be used to control the power of companies in three different ways: 1) Transparency on environmental and social impacts from corporates: mandatory disclosure 2) Accountability (legal) for harm done by corporates to environment and people, and 3) Access to justice for communities and NGOs. So far the EU is not very constructive in the process, and many northern multinationals press to keep the Voluntary Principles in place.

Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC) Treaty: With support from the Netherlands Government, Rwanda, DR Congo and Uganda are currently negotiating a treaty for the governance of the Greater Virunga (covering Virunga NP, Queen Elizabeth NP and possibly more protected areas). The GVTC brings together wildlife agencies of the three countries to ensure coordination of the protected areas. It is hoped that the treaty will reinforce repression of any harmful activities in cross-border protected areas of DR Congo, Uganda and Rwanda.

MDGs and SDGs: The 7th Millennium Development Goal (ensure environmental sustainability) presents another international framework that fits the thematic programme well. The same goes for some of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals that aim to build on the MDG results (especially SDG 7 on affordable and clean energy, but also SDG 13 on climate action and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions).

International Criminal Court: The International Criminal Court (ICC) recently announced to now also consider widespread environmental destruction, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and unlawful dispossession of land (in peacetime) as crimes under international law. This opens up the possibility to prosecute company executives or politicians responsible for these crimes. The measure comes after results with national court cases on liability for massive environmental damage caused by companies were disappointing. This was for example the case with a US court ruling finding BP supervisors not guilty of a Clean Water Act violation after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. International legislation may strengthen the possibility to claim liability in similar cases.

Country-specific and transboundary policies:

- Nigeria's Renewable Energy Policy: Nigeria is currently in a process of reform of its renewable energy policy. A draft includes a categorization of types of energy that are considered to be polluting/bad, and others considered as clean/good but not much further detail on concrete options for the Nigeria context is included.
- Nigeria's Petroleum bill: The process of developing the Petroleum bill started 10 years ago and it currently proposes to privatize the oil sector and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). CSOs fear that this will create even more personal enrichment at the expense of community rights. Also, the process lacks participation of civil society and communities, as

the second reading of the bill was more or less done by state officials behind closed doors.

- Nigeria's 'Locus standi': The legal term 'locus standi' defines that a party can participate in a legal case when it is able to demonstrate it is connected to and suffers harm from the situation challenged in court. In Nigeria only directly affected individuals or communities can go to court, whilst intermediate representative of those individuals or communities such as CSOs cannot. Narrow locus standi complicates and to a certain extent restricts litigation opportunities around corporate misconduct.
- Uganda's petroleum regulations: The Uganda Government (Ministry of Energy) currently formulates petroleum regulations for upstream, mid-stream and downstream processes, capturing exploration, production, development, refining, transportation, storage, revenue sharing, etc. The regulations are to include a comprehensive set of requirements, including community participation, revenue sharing, EIAs, etc.
- Uganda's National Environmental Act: The Environmental Act is currently being revised and in draft status. CSOs want the Act to make gas flaring illegal, make public hearings mandatory (including for EIAs), and clarify the constitutional right for third parties to represent communities in case of environmental rights violations. Finally, the aim is to include that corporations/ investors bear responsibility for clean up of oil damage regardless of its cause, and address transboundary energy exploitation.
- DR Congo Compensation issues: It is currently unclear what exactly is included in DR Congo's legal framework with regards to compensation for damage caused by oil exploration/ exploitation, as well as where the responsibility to proof lies (with companies, or with communities). This subject can also be addressed in Uganda and Nigeria for learning and exchange.
- DR Congo licenses (Virunga National Park, Lake Albert plain): Earlier campaigning by the programme's partners resulted in significant delays and withdrawal of the company that explored oil in Virunga National Park (SOCCO). The licenses granted by the Congolese government that cover Virunga are however still valid. With regards to the licenses issued to Total and Tullow Oil of Congo (bloc 1 and 2) CSOs hardly engage in monitoring due to capacity gaps.
- Transboundary Agreements: Different agreements (the Ngorndoto Agreement being the most recent one) have been signed between DR Congo and Uganda on the management and benefit sharing of the transboundary oil reserves of Lake Albert. Also, the agreement requires the two countries put in place a multi-stakeholder committee involving CSOs, communities and government from both countries to monitor implementation of the agreements. Demarcation of the border to avoid conflicts is also foreseen, as well as training of environmental authorities from both countries.
- ICGLR RINR Initiative: The ICGLR is an inter-governmental body of 11 states of the Great Lakes region (including DR Congo and Uganda) that came into being as part of the 2004 Declaration on Peace, Security and Development. Under its Regional Initiative Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) it aims at providing, albeit not binding, policies and technical guidelines on due diligence and how to avoid that natural resource exploitation contributes to conflict. The initiative also demands member states to strengthen community dispute resolution mechanisms, traditional justice system, transitional justice systems and reconciliation processes for managing and sharing benefits from cross border resources.

2.4 STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS

In all focus countries of the programme people rely on lakes and waterways for water for consumption, fishing and irrigation. Potential pollution by oil exploration/exploitation will severely impact the quality of water and therefore also the livelihoods and health of communities, and may increase (cross-border) conflicts. The case of Nigeria proves that these risks are real, as nearly six decades of oil exploitation has polluted waterways, creeks and mangroves. In some areas the soil is polluted to a depth of six meters. As spawning grounds are also polluted, fish stocks are affected, agricultural land destroyed and people are left with very few opportunities to make a living. Many have instead turned to sabotage of oil infrastructure. This fuels an illegal economy

around artisanal refinery and organized (armed) gangs protect the practice. It affects security and is the source of conflicts between communities, and between communities and government and corporations.

The landscapes of the focus countries include distinct biotopes, such as mangroves and mountain rainforests, which are home to a diverse and often rare ensemble of plant and animal species. Of particular reference are the great apes living in the Virunga landscape, whose habitat needs urgent protection because they exist nowhere else in the world. This in itself offers tourism opportunities raising revenues and job potential. The landscapes play a crucial role in sustaining rainfall patterns across Africa and tempering temperature rise due to its carbon absorption potential needed to halt climate change.

In terms of livelihoods, people in the selected landscapes hardly benefit from the value of natural resources. They often don't have access to electricity and earn mostly an income at or below the poverty line. Especially women are vulnerable. Their role in caring for the household places additional burden on women as in the absence of other alternatives they have to gather firewood/produce charcoal (further destroying the environment). They also mostly suffer from adverse effects on their health caused by smoke released when burning these sources of energy for cooking. While we acknowledge that gender refers to how roles between men and women are constructed in society, when it comes to levels of participation in decision-making around energy transition and/or (the violation of) environmental/social rights associated with oil exploration and extraction, women are in particular disadvantaged. ■

3. THEORY OF CHANGE

The just energy transition programme unites partners from Nigeria (ERA), DR Congo (IDPE, Réseau CREF and TBI DR Congo) and Uganda (AFIEGO and NAPE) to start with. The Theory of Change is focusing on coalition building; hence other CSOs from these countries will be included too. Depending on needs, CSOs from other African countries might also be associated to share experiences. The thematic programme comes in addition to country programmes of the above-mentioned CSOs funded under the GLA (or others). This means it seeks to be complementary and work in synergy with individual country-results. It is important to define some of the concepts that are at the heart of the Theory of Change in order to achieve common understanding, as well as to point out a number of important crosscutting issues that run through the programme.

- **Energy transition:** The energy transition process encompasses moving from dirty energy (with a focus on oil) to clean renewable energy options. It means a move away from exploration/exploitation (leave the oil in the soil). Also, as intermediary step, there is a need to address violations or non-compliance of companies with international best practice around human and environmental rights. The proposed transition process will align line with international frame works, such as the Paris Climate Agreement.
- **Inclusive and just:** The transition process should on all levels include communities in decision-making, with special attention to women participation, on equal standing with other process stakeholders. 'Just' looks at whether the alternatives are accessible and affordable to communities in particular, and also looks at the employment perspective of the energy transition (green jobs).
- **Building trust, addressing conflict:** The thematic programme specifically addresses communities that live in areas with heightened risks of and experiences of violence and conflict (gang violence/sabotage, conflicts posed by non-state armed groups, and a history of war involving armies from neighbouring countries). Because of this, trust people have in actors proposing 'solutions' to their problems is low. It is hence important that partners use methods that build trust on community level, avoiding further conflict, and also addressing community conflict that exists.
- **Transboundary challenges:** Especially for communities in eastern DR Congo and Uganda, the political, economic and social transboundary implications of oil exploration and exploitation are extremely relevant, especially since bad management might further exacerbate conflict. Congolese and Uganda partners will include a transboundary focus in their work on the pathways of change.
- **Rights:** The thematic programme addresses rights from a community perspective. We interpret these rights broadly, including human rights violations, environmental rights, women's rights, but also social and cultural rights that may be associated with certain geographical areas or identities of certain groups of people.
- **Best international practice:** The program identifies violations of best international practice on human and environmental rights by oil companies and governments as the basis for lobby and advocacy work. This is with the aim to reduce support for the practice of oil exploration/exploitation, not from the perspective of improving operations, which would strengthen oil companies' rooting.

3.1 DESIRED CHANGE AND CHANGE PATHWAYS

Based on the problem and context analysis presented earlier, the long-term change in the sphere of interest envisioned by the just energy transition programme is as follows:

LT: A pro-people, inclusive and just energy transition that specifically considers gender and vulnerable groups is effective in the African focus countries.

This long-term goal is underpinned by a number of hypotheses. First, it points to a transition process that will divert oil-related interest and investments towards sustainable renewable energy options in the focus countries. This will diminish the incentive to solely rely on oil originating

from the targeted landscapes, which will reduce and eventually halt the production of oil. It also reflects a transition process that in particular addresses realities and aspirations of community members. We believe that if communities actively participate in the agenda setting process and see their needs and aspirations reflected in it, coupled with increased (funding) opportunities to access affordable and environmentally sustainable/ renewable energy options, it will stimulate green job development. This helps to improve people's livelihoods and will reduce the demand for fuel wood and charcoal now used for subsistence energy provision. This makes forested landscapes less prone to destruction and deforestation and these landscapes can continue to safeguard crucial natural services. Finally, the overall goal specifically considers the needs and rights of women and vulnerable groups (economically vulnerable households, specific ethnic/identity groups) because gender or identity-specific vulnerability currently causes them to participate least in decision-making. They also have least access to renewable energy options, while most relying on forest biomass. Sustainable transition hence requires that these groups must first and foremost be taken on board in the agenda-setting process.

In order to reach the long-term goal, different pathways of change lead up to four long to medium-term intermediate outcomes in the sphere of influence of the programme. These are outcomes that the programme wants to achieve in 2020, in part attributable to the programme efforts, in part due to other external processes and/or actors. Please note that the numbering of results does not refer to a priority ranking in terms of their importance. Having said this, within the timespan of the project it is expected that R1 and R3 lie somewhat closer to the direct sphere of influence of participating CSOs than R2 and R4.

R1: CSOs are unified around a common ideology on inclusive and just energy transition.

Most effective lobby and advocacy for energy transition across our Theory of Change (results 2, 3 and 4) can be achieved if CSOs speak with one voice, communicate the same messages, use the same methods of action, and have shared and complementary capacities. That is why capacity building and exchange for mutual learning is crucial, as well as coalition building. Broadening of the knowledge and experiences of coalition members by exchange with CSOs from other African countries and, where relevant, northern countries, on oil-related governance and transition is also stimulated.

R2: Relevant national government agencies in the African focus countries progressively encourage/promote an inclusive and just energy transition.

Secondly, in order for effective energy transition to gain ground, government agencies dealing with oil and renewable energy in the selected focus countries need to be informed, convinced and engaged towards promoting it. Lobby and advocacy will be based on well-researched analyses on the economic potential of renewable options for development. Coupled with legislative lobby and exposure and litigation on oil-related violations will increase government engagement. It is expected that state budgeting and mobilization of foreign investment towards renewable energy will then also progressively increase. Increased thinking about and funding for energy transition will in turn also influence a reduction in oil operations.

R3: Best practices of inclusive and just energy transition exist in communities in the selected landscapes.

It is not the ambition on the programme to invest in the technology and/or physical development of alternative energy options. Rather, the programme aims to bring about awareness on community level and engagement in favour of energy transition. Community participation in scenario development and agenda-setting processes on inclusive and just energy transition under result 1 is crucial for this. Coupled with greater government promotion achieved under pathway/result 2, and ideally supported by increased funding options for renewable energy solutions on community level, we expect that communities increasingly demand for and use renewable energy options, which will help build the presence of best practices used/adopted by community members.

R4: New or existing oil exploration/extraction projects are halted or delayed.

As the process of clear and common agenda setting on inclusive and just energy transition is at the heart of our theory of change, it also means the programme needs to look at oil exploration and exploitation that is already taking place (Nigeria) or at provisions made by government and private actors to launch operations in time to come (DR Congo, Uganda). The programme will

focus on addressing shortcomings and violations of international best practice around human and environment rights standards by companies and governments. Exposure of such violations through litigation and campaigning will further motivate the need for a transition agenda, but also helps delay (and potentially halt) oil projects.

3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE ENVISAGED CHANGE PATHWAYS

The pathways of change include a number of intermediate results within the sphere of control of the programme. Hereunder we also point out the type of strategies/activities that will be developed under each result.

R1: CSOs are unified around a common ideology on inclusive and just energy transition.

- 1.1 **CSOs have strengthened their knowledge about main challenges and problems related to energy transition:** Especially in the DR Congo and Uganda, CSO are relatively uninformed about energy governance. Training and awareness raising efforts will be organized.
- 1.2 **A coalition of CSOs on energy transition is established, and includes women's organisations:** Joining forces and speaking with once voice will help to strengthen leverage of participating CSOs. Women's organisations will be specifically targeted as coalition members to capture gender needs for the transition. Mapping and joint workshops at the onset of the programme will help to focus coalition membership.
- 1.3 **CSOs have strengthened their skills on coalition work, research, cost-benefit analyses, campaigning and lobby and advocacy:** Focusing on energy transition, in particular when having to influence and convince government actors, requires a specific set of strong skills in different fields of action. Multiple high-quality training and exchange of experience (visits) is proposed to build relevant skills and capacities.
- 1.4 **Evidence-based scenarios for inclusive and just transition are developed:** A transition agenda needs to be underpinned with solid research evidence. The coalition will hence conduct research on aspects that feeds the scenario development process (legal analyses, cost-benefit analyses, just transition barriers, prospects of green jobs, market analyses, etc.). Community members will provide input for the research scope (link to intermediary result 3.1).
- 1.5 **CSOs achieve consensus on the (national) agenda/roadmap for inclusive and just energy transition:** Based on the possible scenarios, the coalition needs to define, in cooperation with communities, what the common agenda will be, as well as to point out national specificities. Consensus will be reached through validation workshops.
- 1.6 **CSOs disposes of a common charter for inclusive and just energy transition:** The coalition will adopt a charter (or bill of rights) outlining the conditions under which the efforts and leverage of the energy transition principle will be organized. Combined with joint lobby and campaign work and international outreach on the coalition's charter, it should help strengthen the coalition's legitimacy and sustainability.

R2: Relevant national government agencies in the African focus countries progressively encourage/promote an inclusive and just energy transition.

- 2.1 **Joint lobby and advocacy campaigns on inclusive and just energy transition are effective:** Lobby and advocacy will engage different strategies and methods to disseminate and build support for the (national) agenda on transition. Specific lobby work on (inter) national policies/regulations in support of the transition agenda will also be done (in line with the examples of policies to address presented in chapter 2.4, also see 3.5).
- 2.2 **National governments acknowledge the agenda/roadmap for inclusive and just energy transition:** Lobby and advocacy will help inform governments about energy transition so that they acknowledge energy transition as the way forward. Challenges in achieving this may differ per context, but that is where the advantage of experience sharing among the coalition comes in.

- 2.3 **Relevant national government agencies are aware of and stimulated by financial opportunities of energy transition:** Through the lobby and advocacy efforts of the coalition, countries will be motivated by the economic return to investment prospect of providing the technology that will drive the energy of the future.
- 2.4 **Funds and budgets for inclusive and just energy transition are identified and available for the benefits of communities:** Complementary lobby and advocacy for (diversion of money towards) funding of renewable energy projects will be undertaken among international financial institutes as well as national budgeters. The emphasis lies on ensuring that public finance, loans and subsidies currently invested in oil prospecting and extraction be diverted towards renewable sources of energy.


R3: Best practices of inclusive and just energy transition exist in communities in the selected landscapes

- 3.1 **Targeted communities have increased their awareness and knowledge on inclusive and just energy transition:** Communities are not all aware of the negative impact of oil exploitation and their knowledge about a clear energy transition agenda is generally limited. Through training and exchange visits for targeted communities in the focus landscapes, in line with the agreed transition agenda, this can be increased.
- 3.2 **Wider community appropriation of the need for inclusive and just energy transition:** Also the wider community needs to become supportive to the transition agenda. This is to be achieved by engaging (and training) for example journalists and Universities.
- 3.3 **Targeted communities are mobilized/organised to demand for and engage in inclusive and just energy transition:** If communities understand that the proposed transition agenda will benefit them more than the current situation and/or hopes they may have about future oil revenues, they will be mobilized to engage and claim renewable energy solutions. If funds have been secured for specific community projects under pathway 2, it will strengthen critical mass on energy transition.

R4: New or existing oil exploration/extraction projects are halted or delayed

- 4.1 **(a) Joint campaigns to expose environmental crimes and human rights violations of oil companies and governments are effective:** When cases arise, the coalition will campaign both nationally and internationally to expose violations of international best practices of human and environmental rights standards. As such scandals inform communities and embarrass governments, it reinforces pathways 2 and 3.
- 4.1 **(b) Litigation on environmental crimes and human rights violations of oil companies and governments is undertaken:** On the same level as the previous intermediate result, and mutually reinforcing, litigation in southern countries and home countries of oil companies around specific crimes, violations and non-compliance is supported. Court decisions might delay or stop operations. Litigation will also affect the company's image, potentially negatively affecting operations.
- 4.2 **Oil companies are forced to undertake clean-up, restoration and compensation of communities and their environments:** Court decisions, but also public outcry caused by joint campaign work, pressure companies to address the violations, crimes or non-compliance they caused on community/environmental level. This will help reduce the negative consequences of exploration and exploitation of oil on the environment.
- 4.3 **Exploitation costs of oil companies will increase with regards to social, economic and environmental compensations:** As the previous steps in this pathway will increase operational costs for companies, it becomes less profitable to operate. This will also delay or halt further oil investments.

3.3 VISUALIZATION OF THEORY OF CHANGE



3.4 ASSUMPTIONS

The theory of change reflects a number of assumptions around the causal thinking that shapes the logic of change and underpins the proposed interventions.

ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

- **A similar price or drop in the oil price will strengthen momentum for energy transition:** We assume that the oil price remains the same or goes down over the course of the next four years. This will maintain or slow exploration and production incentives. It will also increase motivation on behalf of government agencies and large international funding structures to reflect on renewable alternatives, hence generation sufficient room for manoeuvre to push for a transition process on behalf of the coalition partners involved in the thematic programme. Although it is predicted oil prices increase by 2035, we assume that sufficient progress on energy transition is made by then so that it will help to sustainably reduce demand for oil.
- **International instruments serve as backstop to the programme outcomes:** The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change is the most recent landmark framework for international action in support of reducing carbon emissions. Together with other potentially upcoming international instruments, it presents an important backstop for building arguments around energy transition.
- **Environmental, social and cultural values are non-negotiable:** We assume that undivided agreement exists that that environmental, social and cultural values attached to ecosystems are considered to be priceless perceived as non-negotiable and will hence be taken into account by the different actors addressed by the programme.

ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO CIVIL SOCIETY

- **The coalition has sufficient capacity to build critical mass:** We assume that acting as a group with sufficient capacity can generate critical mass to successfully influence governments and corporations. Strong ties and joint effort also help to create a strong common identity and strengthens the leverage of CSOs to reach the outcomes.
- **Right, correct and full information will be available and accessible:** Building a strong energy transition agenda and formulating strong arguments for campaigning and advocacy work require solid information and data that is correct and fully available. Capacity building and networking will help to achieve this.
- **Operational secure space for CSOs is assured:** We assume that the general operational space for CSOs in the focus countries to speak out and act will not worsen over the course of the programme. Measures will be put in place by to denounce potential risks.
- **Strong CSOs are not susceptible to private sector and government influence:** When lobby and advocacy is done in coalition, individual organisations will not be susceptible to private sector or government influence (including corruption). Capacitating CSOs on how to resist such influence will reduce this potential risk.

ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

- **Governments are willing to address energy transition:** The willingness of government authorities to engage in a transition process towards renewable energy options depends on clear proof and strong arguments about the long-term economic benefits transition offers the country, analysed against to oil revenues.
- **Participation of CSOs in national budget process is guaranteed:** In order to make national budget shares available to support transition options, the budgeting process on the side of government should allow space for CSOs to introduce transition options. We assume that the coalition can (in) formally participate in this process.
- **Judiciary are willing to take on cases against oil companies and/or governments:** Success in filing legal complaints and pushing for legal proceedings on corporate or governmental misconduct, national (and potential international) jurisdictions need to be willing to act on violations. Also communities need to trust that legal proceedings may work in their favour, which will help strengthen their participation in legal proceedings.

ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO COMMUNITY BUY-IN

- **Having access to information serves as eye opener and catalyst for engagement:** Communities will better understand how oil exploitation degrades their environment and mostly serves the establishment/rich if they have full access about risks and alternatives. Once people's eyes are opened up to this, it helps convincing them that leaving the oil in the soil is the best option for prosperity and future development, hence motivating people to adopt renewable energy alternatives.
- **(Inter) national funding is available for (community-based) renewable energy projects:** 'The empty stomach has no ears' is a famous Congolese expression. The outcomes of the programme assume that (inter) national funding for (community-based) renewable energy projects can be accessed and channelled toward transition opportunities. Renewable energy projects or initiatives on community level present business opportunities and help to improve livelihoods, which will further strengthen buy-in.
- **Strong communities are not susceptible to private sector and government influence:** Similar to what was referenced in relation to CSOs, strong and informed communities that begin to see the (economic) benefits of renewable energy options will neither be susceptible to private sector or government influence.

3.5 INTERNATIONAL LOBBY AND ADVOCACY STRATEGIES OF PARTICIPATING CSOS AND ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Referring back to paragraph 2.4, this paragraph introduces the lobby and advocacy strategies proposed for specific policies, followed by lobby and advocacy strategies that could be deployed or exchanged for learning with regards to community, governments, corporations or international actors.

- **Paris agreement:** Programme partners will lobby for and monitor national incorporation/implementation of the agreement through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC).²³ Also opportunities to tap into the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are explored, while lobbying to block 'dirty' energy projects being funded by GCF. The partners will continue to engage in the core process (attending important meetings, etc.). Especially the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) review that is scheduled for 2018 is crucial in this respect. Learning and exchange on policies from other countries addressing climate change and carbon reduction will also take place, for example around the Dutch Climate Act that sets clear carbon reduction targets.
- **REDD+ Framework:** The REDD+ framework presents an additional framework in support of energy transition, including carbon trading. More specifically, in the context of DR Congo and Uganda it supports lobby work around the conservation of protected areas (ex. national parks, UNESCO heritage sites, spawning zones of lake-based ecosystems) threatened by the exploration and exploitation of oil.
- **Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Treaty (GVTC):** CSOs and communities will under this programme use the treaty to pressure for a just energy transition in the region, as well as to reinforce the need to halt oil explorations and exploitation in areas that are within or bordering protected areas.
- **Environmental Impact Assessment Frameworks:** The thematic programme proposes to lobby to broaden and expand the focus of EIAs, to push for enforcement of mitigation, and to prepare and press for more inclusiveness with regards to community participation and decision-making. Exchange between countries on existing framework is opportune, for example on obligatory consultation and reverse charge of proof (companies, not communities) in case of damage (Dutch mining law is interesting).

²³ NDCs reflect the countries' actions for carbon emission reduction based on domestic circumstances and capabilities. A feedback process whereby national plans are communicated internationally is foreseen.

- **(Forthcoming) UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights:** Through a global NGO alliance on this treaty (<http://thetreatymovement.com>), the coalition can provide input or participate in lobby work. Of particular interest is the need to make the Treaty binding and reflect on the accompanying legal framework that needs to be put in place to enforce non-compliance. Participation in the agenda setting process for the Treaty (conferences, working groups, meetings), and petitions or publications addressing the UN and members countries is foreseen.
- **MDGs and SDGs:** Analysis of progress, using the framework as lobby tool for granting people with greater renewable energy access, will be done under the programme.
- **International Criminal Court:** Milieudefensie started litigation against Shell 7 years ago, claiming compensation for pollution in Nigeria's Delta (Ogoniland). The case is dealt with by the Dutch justice system and additional international jurisdiction might potentially provide additional legal backing. Under the thematic programme scoping into the prospects the ICC measure offers for (new) litigation cases will be done.

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC AND TRANSBOUNDARY POLICIES

- **Nigeria's Renewable Energy Policy:** More specific focus and decisions on how exactly Nigeria plans to transit fossil fuels towards renewable sources of energy are still lacking and needs to be developed.
- **Nigeria's Petroleum bill:** The thematic programme will help to build CSO consensus on the privatization issue, ensuring community participation in preparing propositions for inclusion as well as public hearings around the third reading of the bill.
- **Nigeria's 'Locus standi':** Whilst obtaining locus standi for third parties will involve a process of constitutional change, which is difficult to obtain through this programme, lobby to build support for the issue could be explored.
- **Uganda's petroleum regulations:** Ugandan partners engage in the process of defining petroleum regulations through the IUCN SRJS programme. The just energy transition programme looks at transboundary implications between Uganda and DR Congo of these regulations, especially from the perspective of avoiding community conflicts.
- **Uganda's National Environmental Act:** Once more, Ugandan CSOs lobby on key topics to be included in the Act (criminalizing gas flaring, mandatory public hearings, locus standi, corporate responsibility for damage) under the SJRS programme. The just energy transition programme will be complementary in specifically addressing transboundary implications of the Act.
- **DR Congo Compensation issues:** Under the GLA country programme a legal study into the main legislative framework with regards to environmental protection is scheduled, and it is proposed that the just energy transition program makes a sub-analysis on oil.
- **DR Congo oil exploitation in Virunga National Park:** On-going lobby work around the cancellation of exploration licenses covering the Virunga National Park (GLA country programme) will be reinforced by the joint lobby work on the basis of international frameworks. For the Lake Albert plain, there is a need to put in place strategies that allow for scrutiny/monitoring with the aim to delay or raise costs of oil operations.
- **Transboundary Agreements:** In ensuring that energy resources are managed well in case both governments do go ahead with oil exploitation, the thematic programme will use the Agreements to raise community awareness about their rights so as to make them capable to resist operations if it fails to address these rights.
- **ICGLR RINR Initiative:** As ICGLR is close interrelated to (and depending on) political processes in member countries; the thematic programme could monitor and engage with member states around community decision-making and conflict-resolution.

Community level lobby and advocacy: This focuses on awareness raising about energy transition coupled with (learning from experiences of other communities) information about negative consequences of oil exploration and exploitation in order to build critical mass demanding oil companies to clean-up, compensate or halt operations.

STRATEGY	CSOS WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
Community involvement in full project planning/implementation process	ERA, NAPE, AFIEGO, IDPE
Participatory Action Research (involving communities in research)	ERA, TBI partners, VMD
Film screenings, drama about realities in other countries/communities	IDPE, RCREF
Community visits to exploration/exploitation sites within/between landscapes	ERA, IDPE, RCREF, AFIEGO, NAPE, TBI
Discussion fora/meetings between communities and leadership	TBI
Involve communities in preparing and presenting concrete proposals	AFIEGO, NAPE
Media training on how to cover environment concerns	ERA, AFIEGO/NAPE
Field trips with journalist/policy makers	ERA, NAPE/AFIEGO, TBI, VMD
Solidarity visits between Dutch and African public/experts	VMD
Disseminate research findings in accessible format and language for community	TBI, NAPE, AFIEGO
Community monitoring of violations through video/photography	IDPE, RCREF, AFIEGO, NAPE, VMD
Demonstration of energy alternatives on household level	ERA, TBI
Organize manifestation and marches in oil communities against exploitation	IDPE, RCREF

Policy and government level: Lobby and advocacy strategies will be geared towards mobilizing government support for an inclusive and just energy transition, realizing legislative reform, as well as securing funding for renewable energy projects (on community level) through state budgets and international finance institutions.

STRATEGY	CSOS WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
Policy analyses on gaps regarding community rights	RCREF, IDPE, AFIEGO, TBI
Prepare written propositions/MoUs on policies to government actors	RCREF, IDPE, AFIEGO
Prepare letters/petitions to denounce violations of human rights	RCREF, IDPE, NAPE, AFIEGO, VMD
Initiate bills (review) through parliament members MPs	ERA, AFIEGO, NAPE, TBI
Legislative training for parliament members on policy brief writing	ERA, AFIEGO
Writing to banks to divert/increase funding towards green alternatives	NAPE, AFIEGO, VMD
Meetings/workshops/conferences with political leaders to share agenda	RCREF, IDPE, ERA, TBI, AFIEGO, NAPE
Discussion fora/consultations between communities and leadership	AFIEGO, NAPE, TBI
Litigation of national government	VMD, ERA, NAPE, AFIEGO
Air radio talk shows between government and CSOs (ERA)	ERA, AFIEGO, NAPE

Corporate and international level: Strategies addressing companies will mostly be focused on indirect engagement, although some direct engagement is also foreseen where possible/accessible. Campaigning, litigation and other pressure strategies aim at delaying or halting oil operations. It can also help to access alternative funding for transition, and strengthens support for and (global) visibility of the coalition's work.

STRATEGY	CSOS WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
Meeting with shareholders through GA meetings and informal meetings	IDPE, NAPE, TBI partners, VMD
Joint quarterly meetings with CSOs and CEOs	ERA, AFIEGO, NAPE
Peer influence through companies that comply with international standards	IUCN
Research into mal practices of corporations	ERA, TBI, VMD, FoE
CSO coalitions through email and whatsapp networks	AFIEGO, NAPE
Name and shame via cartoons, media exposure, community protests, awards	ERA
Litigation/court cases in Nigeria and beyond	ERA, VMD, AFIEGO, NAPE
Proof of corruption shared with international partners for publication	IDPE, RCREF, AFIEGO
Protest against oil companies through writing letters and petitions	VMD, AFIEGO
Share information about local human rights violations to international media	IDPE, RCREF, AFIEGO, TBI partners
Mapping of linkages between corporate and political representatives	VMD, TBI
Organise strike actions in collaboration with labour unions of corporation staff	ERA
Blocking physical access to oil sites	ERA, NAPE
Visits to governments home base of international corporations, participation in international fora around the Paris Agreement	IDPE, NAPE, AFIEGO, TBI, ERA, VMD
Campaigning to pressure Northern governments about non-compliance/violations committed by companies	VMD
Use international VIP 'ambassadors'	IDPE, RCREF

It is also in particular interesting for the thematic programme to look into experiences from other countries and continents in building **peaceful public resistance movements** as a specific strategy to involve communities in claiming energy transition and defending their rights wherever oil companies do not comply with best international standards on human and environmental rights. Peaceful movements represent a powerful force that helps influence corporations and governments in favour of energy transition. It will also strengthen the opportunity to link with other international movements already existing/active. Of additional interest is to look into strategies that increase **transmission of community-based information** towards the coalition. This will help realize pathway 3, and feed into pathway 1. Also, strategies to assure the **security** of CSOs and communities lobbying and advocating for energy transition are needed. This would involve building knowledge on what the legal boundaries of action are to minimize repressive action by government and/or companies. Wider **networking with multiple stakeholders** in the field of human rights defence, international activism and technical experts will help to create a protective cordon of allies 'carrying' the work done by CSOs under the thematic programme.

3.6

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES OF PARTICIPATING CSOS²⁴

This paragraph addresses the thematic/methodological and PMEL capacities that will be strengthened, linking it to the pathways of change to be achieved. Capacity development can be achieved through targeted individual actions or coalition-based training. Also exchange visits will contribute towards capacity strengthening. We seek to match offer and demand for such visits. More concrete plans on individual organizational level will be included in the partner plans to be developed by the end of the year 2016.

THEMATIC AND METHODOLOGICAL CAPACITIES

- **Coalition building:** Although many partners have previously engaged in networks or occasional coalitions around a project, this project aims for a wide 'common-voice' coalition across CSOs working on (energy) governance, potentially also involving the wider African contexts. Capacities on stakeholder mobilisation methods and how to build strong added value will be strengthened (result 1).
- **Movement building:** On wider community level capacities to build a peaceful movement in favour of energy transition will be strengthened, especially learning from methods used by other successful movements across the world. This can be used for community awareness raising (result 3).
- **Research (publication) methodology:** Research done under the programme needs to be rock-solid in terms of methodology. Capacity building will especially address investigative research techniques, and approaches to build an argument in different types of publications (reports, briefs, press releases, etc.). Depending on needs, it may also involve technical (field) research capacities such as GIS.
- **Cost-benefit analysis:** Specific attention goes out to building capacities around cost-benefit analyses involved in comparative assessments about the long-term financial prospects energy transition offers as opposed to the costs of with oil extraction. Although experts can be hired to perform such studies, the partners' capacities will be build on how to make use of such analyses for lobby and advocacy work (result 1, 2).
- **Lobby and advocacy:** There is potential to strengthen especially strategies of engaging with government actors. Of further interest may perhaps be to learn about techniques companies generally use for lobby and advocacy, to better understand where such arguments can be countered/deconstructed (result 2, 3, and 4).
- **Security monitoring and safeguards:** Building on previous efforts, there is a need to continue capacity strengthening on security measures CSOs and communities can take to avoid intimidation or worse. It will involve reflecting on what the legal boundaries of action are (result 1).

²⁴It is to be mentioned that partners have individually performed a detailed organizational analysis under GLA, presenting a body of background on existing and to be strengthened capacities. These documents will be used for future reference under the thematic programme, also to assess progress made.

PMEL CAPACITIES

- **Outcome mapping/harvesting:** The GLA programme in general aims to use outcome mapping/harvesting as methodology to capture change on outcome/progress level. Partner CSOs have not worked with the method before and therefore the alliance will take the lead in organizing training on outcome harvesting.
- **Data validation and documentation:** Specific attention goes out to how to quantify, attribute and validate observed changes (beyond what the outcome mapping method offers), as well as how to document successes, failures and lessons learned.
- **Communicating lessons learned:** Methodologies to write messages that capture lessons learned, successes and programme accountability need to be strengthened. This focuses on programme reporting, as well as on messaging for external communication (for international use) and lobby and advocacy work, using different formats.
- **Language:** As the programme involves both English and French-speaking partners, building partners' mutual capacities to speak, read and write both languages must be looked into. Although part of this responsibility lies with the partners under their other programme work, the exchange visits will help further strengthening.

Even though an extensive mapping of potential coalition members is among the first activities to undertake by the programme, some organisations that also work in support of the results to be achieved in the different landscapes are mentioned below. Please note that the skills referenced in the first column refer only to selected strategies as presented under the pathways of change in chapter 3.2.

CAPACITIES	OTHER NGOS THAT HAVE THESE CAPACITIES/WORK ON IT
Related to pathway 1 Training capacities on skills associated with research, cost-benefit analysis, campaigning, lobby and advocacy, etc.	<p>Niger Delta: Host Communities Network, Movement for the survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), *women farmers association of Nigeria</p> <p>DR Congo Virunga: Synergie des Ecologists pour la paix et le Developpement; ACDH, FECOPEILE, SOPR, BOAD, CEFAD, CREDDA, GADHOP, ACEDH (Alerte Congolaise pour l'Environnement et les droits de l'Homme).</p> <p>DR Congo Ituri: APAJ, Association for Paralegals</p> <p>Uganda: International Alert, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), NAWAD-National Association of Women Action in Development</p>
Related to pathway 1 Research and scenario-building on energy transition, green development, and diversion away from oil dependence	<p>Niger Delta: CENTEX university of Port Harcourt, ICEED</p> <p>DR Congo Virunga: Synergie des Ecologists pour la paix et le Developpement, ACDH, FECOPEILE, SOPR, BREAD (Bureau de Recherche, d'Encadrement et d'Actions pour le Développement), CREDDA</p> <p>DR Congo Ituri: PAPHY</p> <p>Uganda: Civil Society Coalition on Oil (CSCO)</p>
Related to pathway 2 Lobby and advocacy campaigning towards government around energy transition and alternative energy financing mechanisms	<p>Niger Delta: ICEED</p> <p>DR Congo Virunga: Synergie des Ecologists pour la paix et le Developpement; ACDH, FECOPEILE, SOPR, UFPDIP</p> <p>DR Congo Ituri: OCEAN (Concerted Organization for Friends of Nature)</p> <p>Uganda: Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI), Eco-trust</p>
Related to pathway 3 Community mobilization around energy transition (including making renewable energy options available), and human and environmental rights	<p>Niger Delta: ICEED</p> <p>DR Congo Virunga: Synergie des Ecologists pour la paix et le Developpement; ACDH, Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme (CRED-DHO), ACEDH, Dynamique des Femmes Juristes, LOFEPACO, FECOPEILE</p> <p>DR Congo Ituri: COCOLPE, FLEVICA (Streams of Life that Flow Towards Others), ACOPELA (Association of Cooperatives of Fishers of Lake Albert), APAJ</p> <p>Uganda: Global Rights Alert, World Voices Uganda</p>
Related to pathway 4 Naming and shaming and litigation against oil companies that violate international best practices on human and environmental rights	<p>Niger Delta: Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth Europe, Platform</p> <p>DR Congo Virunga: Synergie des Ecologists pour la paix et le Developpement; ACDH, FECOPEILE, CREDDHO, ACEDH, CREDDA</p> <p>DR Congo Ituri: APAJ</p> <p>Uganda: Forum for Women in Democracy</p>

3.7 PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION

The overall financial management remains with the alliance members. As mentioned, the African CSOs are directly contracted by their 'traditional' partner (alliance member). A steering group including one elected partner per focus country has been established. For Uganda this is Afiego (Dickens Kamugisha), for DR Congo Réseau CREF (Alphonse Valivambene), and for Nigeria ERA (Godwin Ojo, chair). Alliance members also participate in the steering group, represented by Tina Lain for IUCN, a Milieudefensie staff member (who is yet to be specified) and Trudi van Ingen for Tropenbos International. The key role of the steering group is to strategically reflect on and keep track of implementation of the programme. The steering group meets twice year, of which one of the meetings will simultaneously take place with the annual monitoring, evaluation and learning meeting (see next chapter). In addition, regular Skype meetings are held on a needs-based basis. The effectiveness of the steering group and its members will be evaluated by the end of 2017.

Programme implementation is further supported by a liaison role in charge of facilitating effective programme implementation, coordination, monitoring and reporting and learning the African implementing partners. The Nigeria partner ERA has been unanimously chosen for this role. The liaison role involves the following tasks:

- Organise and chair steering group meetings and other annual reflection and planning meetings. ERA needs to factor in some budget for organization and venue costs.
- Assure synergy of vision, strategies and implementation of the programme within the core-group of partners.
- Assure information sharing with partners and coalition members, including information on opportunities and programme results. To this end a simple communication strategy for the core group of partners will be developed, with attention for restitution within the own organisations.
- Assure synergy between the thematic programme, GLA country programmes, other GLA thematic programmes, and other programmes on partner level that are of complementary relevance.
- Explore possibilities to connect with other African/international coalition initiatives around energy transition.
- Coordination of monitoring and learning of the programme (once a year a physical meeting) and planning (potentially as well a physical meeting), assuring that implementing partners deliver required information/data, performing the overall analysis of results and lessons learned, and feeding back findings and observations to the implementing partners for further fine-tuning of programmes and planning.
- Writing annual work plans for the thematic programme energy governance, with input from other partners.

Immediate next steps following the inception workshop held in Nigeria:

- The draft inception report will be shared with the Alliance level steering group the 17th of November 2016. After feedback, the final version will be shared with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the end of November 2016.
- On the basis of the inception report, each individual southern partner will develop a (draft) work plan for 2017 by the end of November 2017.
- On the basis of these plans an overall annual plan for 2017 for the thematic programme will be made, with some first outlines for the common agenda to work on/develop. ERA will have the lead in doing this, with support from the thematic programme-level steering group and, since it is the first annual planning exercise under the thematic programme, additional coaching by VMD will be provided. The annual plan format will be shared by the alliance.
- The year plan will be shared with the thematic level-level steering group mid-December, after which also the Alliance level core group will provide feedback. ■

4. MONITORING AND LEARNING

4.1

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

In line with the capacity development priorities described under paragraph 3.6, related indicators for monitoring and learning are included below. The GLA capacity assessments each individual partner filled out serve as a baseline, from which some of the references to 'levels' below stems from (1 = non existing, 2 = weak, 3 = moderate, 4 = important).

- **Coalition building:** General participation in networks is at level 4, but strong topic-based and geographically wider coalition building is not at the same level (we could estimated it to be at 2).
- **Movement building:** Although general interaction with and mobilization of communities is at level 4, the specific movement building aspect of it is probably around level 2-3.
- **Research (publication) methodology:** Research capacities range between 3-4, depending on the topic and methods used. It could be moved towards an overall 4.
- **Cost-benefit analysis:** Although not referenced among the capacities in the GLA assessment tool, the partners' capacities range between 1 and 2, as many have not worked with such type of financial/macro economic analyses before. We aim to reach level 3 over the course of the programme.
- **Lobby and advocacy:** Partners generally estimate their lobby and advocacy capacities to range around 3. The aim is to move to level 4.
- **Security monitoring and safeguards:** Current levels of security monitoring range between 3 and 4. There is a need to aim for the highest measures possible and we would like to move it towards level 4.
- **Outcome mapping/harvesting:** As partners have not used outcome mapping/harvesting, it is uncharted territory (level 1). We aim to reach level 3.
- **Data validation and documentation:** Partners estimate their capacities on monitoring and evaluation between 2 and 3. With the help of outcome mapping, added with complementary methods on validation and documenting, we hope to reach overall 3.
- **Communicating lessons learned:** Similar to the point above, we hope to reach 3.
- **Language:** French-English language capacities on both sides range between 1 and 2. Although part of the effort to build such capacities falls within individual partner planning, as mentioned before, we hope that exchange will help reach levels 2 to 3.

4.2

LOBBY AND ADVOCACY

The focus of lobby and advocacy work around policies has been referenced earlier in this report. Below an estimation of the level we hope to reach with the proposed efforts.

- Incorporation/implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and tapping into and monitoring allocations from the Green Climate Fund: Now level 1-2 (given recent adoption of Agreement), we hope to move to 3.
- Engagement in process through attending Paris Agreement/COP meetings is currently 3 and we hope to move to 4 through stronger joint agenda setting during these meetings.
- Pushing for implementation of REDD+ will remain steady at 3.
- Lobby and advocacy on EIA framework broadening and pushing for mitigation and full community engagement is currently around level 2 (mostly due to obstacles presented by governments/companies). We hope to reach level 3.
- In the process of developing and hopefully ratification of the UN treaty on Business and Human Rights we hope to move from 2 (given the early stage the process is in) to 3.
- The use of MDGs for general lobby and advocacy is to be maintained at level 3-4.
- Understanding on how the extended ICC mandate on international environment crimes can benefit the context of this project is currently at level 1 (new ICC measure) and should be developed to level 3.
- Many of the national policy frameworks are either in the process of being developed or reviewed. We estimate them to be at level 2, and we hope through strong CSOs engagement in the different processes it can be moved to 3.

The overall indicators to measure outcomes for both international frameworks and national policies are as follows (some overlap is noted with the M&E framework presented in the next paragraph as the pathway of engaging national governments on energy transition is closely related to policy-work).

- Propositions made by CSOs on adaptation/inclusion/altering (inter) national policies, regulations, result into reference to an inclusive and just energy transition in these policies, regulations, etc.
- The degree of advancement in policy processes for the development of new laws and regulations that recognize/reference inclusive and just energy transition.
- Rejection or postponement of adverse policies, commitments, measures, legislation and standards that CSOs and Alliance members have been lobbying and advocating against in the field of oil exploration and exploitation.
- The agenda setting, level and nature of reflection by government agencies on inclusive and just transition through parliamentary debate/political meeting processes.

4.3 LEARNING

The thematic programme will be guided by several learning questions that in part link back to the assumptions of expected change, but also go beyond the pathway outcomes. The questions translate the wish to learn from the thematic focus, ways of working, approaches/methods used, etc. In order to be able to find answers to these questions, it is primordial that the partners keep throughout the programme track of these questions, preferably through the annual learning meetings scheduled (see next paragraph).

Lessons to learn around work in coalition

- Does working in a strong/unified coalition influence how the results and also the coalition itself are/is appreciated by 'outsiders'?
- Has the coalition managed to be the 'seed' for expansion across the African continent, unifying agenda setting around energy transition?
- What lessons can be learned from bringing together organisations around an energy transition programme that have distinct and different histories/mandates?
- What is the added value of a multi-country programme on a shared theme, in addition to country programmes that also (partially) address the issue of oil?
- How has a coalition-focused programme helped to strengthen the operational space, protection and resistance to corporate influence of/by the CSOs involved?

Lessons to learn about wider programme effects

- What can be learned about the activities or processes that have influenced perception change on behalf of communities? (ex. transboundary conflict perceptions, beliefs that oil is the solution to poverty, trust in alternative sources of energy for development potential)?
- Which results of the programme have most likely benefited from the fact that CSOs, communities and political leaders had the opportunity to be 'exposed' to other country-realities by learning and exchange visits?
- What can be learned about the contribution of gender specific agenda setting for inclusive and just energy transition when looking at the programme results?
- In how far has the programme managed to influence the established field of actors in power that are active/relate to the oil sector? What is key in achieving this? What were obstacles in not achieving this?
- Are there signs/reasons to believe that the results of the programme have indirectly contributed to a reduction in destruction of forested areas due to using wood/charcoal for subsistence household energy needs?
- Are there signs/reasons to believe that the programme has contributed to a stronger movement advocating for safeguarding protected areas such as forest reserves, national parks, UNESCO heritage sites?
- In how far did the programme benefit, or was obstructed by, global developments in the

field of oil production, energy politics and transition towards renewable options (ex. oil price, international frameworks, funding streams/opportunities)?

Lessons to learn about PMEL

- What can be learned about minimum standards in gathering, analysing, documenting and presenting information that represents the core of an argument in favour of just energy transition, with regards to the impact such information had?
- In how far were language differences overcome for joint and equal participation in action, exchange and learning?
- What can be learned from using outcome mapping/harvesting as a methodology to monitoring and evaluation?

4.4 PMEL

In order to assure solid monitoring, evaluation and learning, as much as possible GLA tools on capacity building, engagement and PMEL are used. All coalition members of the just energy transition programme will meet annually to analyse progress, draw lessons from it, where relevant refine the ToC, and develop ways forward that incorporate what has been learned (logically scheduled in September to provide input for the next years planning process). These meetings involve the steering group partners, added with selected CSO members from the coalition. Continuous monitoring will be done on partner level, and the coordination function (ERA) is expected to draw intermediate lessons each year around February (on the basis of the annual reports of the previous year). A detailed monitoring, evaluation and learning plan will be developed early 2017, the following outcome indicators of change have been identified in relation to the main outcomes of the pathways of change.

OUTCOMES	INDICATORS	EXAMPLES OF UNIT OF MEASUREMENT
R 1. CSOs are unified around a common ideology on inclusive and just energy transition	The coalition has expanded and diversified its membership to build critical mass around inclusive and just energy transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of members • Type of members
	Coalition members share information relevant to the process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information communication tool on coalition level present • Effectiveness in following/implementing the tool
	Collaborative action on campaigning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of joint statements • Number of exchange visits • Number of campaign successes
	Level of quality of decision making by partners to reach a shared agenda on inclusive and just energy transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degree of participation in meetings • Level of satisfaction with agenda focus
	Degree of integration of/collaboration by community members and coalition members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of collaboration requests/examples • Level of satisfaction by communities on coalition's work
	The efforts and results of the coalition are recognized on (inter) national level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awards won by local partners • (Inter) national media coverage
R 2. Relevant national government agencies progressively put in practice an inclusive and just energy transition	Propositions made by CSO coalition members on inclusive and just transition are treated by relevant government agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of propositions made • Examples of acceptance or adoption of propositions exist
	Parliament members and special committees charged with energy/oil increasingly discuss topics related to an inclusive and just energy transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parliamentary meeting calendars • Minutes of parliamentary/commission meetings • Informal discussion with parliamentarians
	Parliament members and special committees charged with energy/oil increasingly discuss topics related to an inclusive and just energy transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parliamentary meeting calendars • Minutes of parliamentary/commission meetings • Informal discussion with parliamentarians
	A national plan on inclusive and just energy transition is accepted by national government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision on acceptance exists • Plan available and shared
	Funds allocated to clean energy projects have increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National state budgets • Specific energy project budgets in the focus countries • Budgets of main international finance institutes
	The political process to formulate a national law inclusive and just energy transition is initiated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-legislative input/draft exists • Presence of MPs in favour
	Relevant laws, regulations, bills on oil and energy governance increasingly reference the need for an inclusive and just energy transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of paragraphs/articles on transition process

OUTCOMES	INDICATORS	EXAMPLES OF UNIT OF MEASUREMENT
R.3. Best practices/examples of inclusive and just energy transition exist on community level	Women (groups) are increasingly mobilized and organized around voicing and defending gender-specific interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of organization on community level Examples of issues voiced Number of women in leading positions in CSOs/communities
	Demand on inclusive and just energy transition voiced by communities are responded to by relevant government agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of demands expressed Level of satisfaction of response
	Complaints that communities express in relation to the non-respect of best international practice by oil companies or governments reduce	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of complaints Level of satisfaction of response
	Women (groups) initiate and pilot renewable energy alternatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (Mini) projects proposed by women Level of satisfaction with livelihood impact of projects
	Communities create a greater number of business opportunities around renewable energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presence of economic activities Level of satisfaction with livelihood impact of revenues
R.4. New or existing oil exploration/extraction projects are delayed or halted	Court cases focusing on the non-respect of best international practice by oil companies or governments instituted increase in number	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of court cases Focus/nature of the claims Degree of reference to relevant international legislation/frameworks
	Better law enforcement on the non-respect of best international practice by oil companies causes oil exploration and exploitation to become more expensive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Judgments that reference violations of best international practice Evaluation of costs Statements by companies on evaluation of costs
	Decision that cancel or halt next steps of new or existing oil projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Length of implementation process Presence of specific (legal) decisions to delay/halt
	Clean up activities are carried out by oil companies and governments in a manner that is satisfactory for affected communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of clean up activities Level of satisfaction by communities

In order to monitor progress on the pathways, specific indicators and the related assumptions, we propose the following strategy:

- **Sources and methods of data collection:** These vary from pre/post test tools for trainings held, meetings with communities/government stakeholders (interviews, focus groups) to direct observation in communities, policy analysis, media coverage analysis, and the analysis of financial/investment data, amongst others. Partners appoint specific human resources for this task along the process cycle. A solid sampling and stratification process for interviews/focus groups will be used so that data are reflective of the wider communities the project focused on, specifically including gender-sensitive selection.
- **Methods of analysis:** There will be different levels of analysis, notably on individual partner level with regards to their part of the programme implemented. Partners will also twice a year be requested to jointly reflect on country level which changes can be observed. The coordination function (ERA) compiles all data to map out programme-wide effects/results. As mentioned before, outcome mapping will be the main method used. This will happen also twice a year, and an annual PMEL meeting where all coalition members gather will further deepen and sustain arguments in support of findings.
- **Dissemination of results:** Aside from the general GLA reporting process, the coalition as well as alliance members will define through which channels results can best be communicated. This includes intermediate briefings on findings that can be shared with media and government stakeholders, for example. Other create methods will also be explored, for example through (short) audio-visual reporting. ■

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